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Comments
IS A MINERAL SERVITUDE DIVISIBLE?
The answer to the question of whether or not a mineral servitude is divisible seems again to be yes and no. The Civil Code'
answers the servitude question in the negative, so of course for some
years the judiciary has been definite in giving the question the same
1. Art. 656, La. Civil Code of 1870.
[534]
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answer so far as the flat theory of the rights is concerned.2 However,
as is well known, the mineral servitude presents many new problems
unanswered by the Code; hence, the courts have of neceessity as
well as for policy reasons taken a realistic attitude in their creation
of the private mineral law of the state. Obviously the path cannot
always follow without deviation the old groove of the theory of the
law, laid down without reference to the problems of mineral law
which were uncontemplated by the redactors of the theories now to
be adjusted to the new substances and the new scientific methods for
their recovery. For example, the Sample v. Whitaker cases' dealing
with good and bad faith prescription stated the original precept of
the law of indivisibility in private mineral rights and at one and the
same time divided the mineral servitude by weighting the balance
in the good faith case4 with the special statute5 on prescription
acquirendi in such cases when minors are involved. The legislature
of 19446 might be said to have further divided the servitude by
vitiating as to major co-owners the effect of the Sample v. Whitaker
case dealing with bad faith and minority where minority was held
to have suspended as to all except the good faith landowner. The
contiguous estate doctrine evolved by the court might be said to have
divided the servitude granted as a single right upon several noncontiguous tracts.' Recently, the court in Lenard v. Shell Oil Company' rebolstered the theory of indivisibility by holding in favor of
a servitude owner on eighty thousand acres of land against a good
faith purchaser of thirty acres, distinguishing the good faith Sample
v. Whitaker"° case by the fact that the original overall servitude
owner had used his right, while in the Sample v. Whitaker case he
had not. Thus the doctrine of interruption by user weighted the
balance against the statute" on good faith acquirendi prescription.
These statements obviously are made in regard to the indivisibility
2. Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana (1 ed. 1939) 24, § 6.
3. Sample v. Whitaker, 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930); Sample v. Whitaker,
172 La. 722, 185 So. 38 (1931); Sample v. Whitaker, 174 La. 245, 140 So.
36 (1932).
4. Sample v. Whitaker, 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930); and 174 La. 245,
140 So. 36, 37 (1932).
5. La. Act 64 of 1924, amending Art. 8478, La. Civil Code of 1870.
6. La. Act 232 of 1944 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§ 4826.3, 4826.41.
7. Sample v. Whitaker, 172 La. 722, 135 So. 38 (1931).
8. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 2, at 79, 80, § 21.
9. Lenard v. Shell Oil Company, 211 La. 265, 29 So. (2d) 844 (1947).
10. Sample v. Whitaker, 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930); and 174 La. 245,
140 So. 36 (1932).
11. La. Act 64 of 1924, amending Art. 3478, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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idea per se. The decisions on rehearing of the cases of Ohio Oil

Company v. Ferguson" and Byrd v. Forgotson" have now been
rendered and give rise to this brief discussion on indivisibility vel
non of the mineral servitude.
In each of these cases the original grantee of the mineral servitude from the landowner sold all mineral rights in a certain area
of the land covered by the servitude and designated this acreage by
the usual descriptions for the surface of the land. The Ohio Oil 4
case dealt with the question of whether user of the servitude on the
land without the boundary of the area disposed of preserved the
right on the specified portion sold which had not been developed.
The Byrd'5 case posed the same problem as to divisibility with the
distinguishing feature of suspension by virtue of minority-owners of
fractional interests on the land outside of the tract in which all the
minerals had been sold. The court decided in both cases that the
causes, that is, user and minority which prolonged the life of the
servitude under the over-all, grant, did not preserve it upon the
surfacely designated plot which had been disposed of by the original
owner of the right. The court emphatically preserved the theory
of the indivisibility of the servitude while in effect dividing it, just
as they did in the Sample v. Whitaker cases.' In Sample v.
Whitaker' the realistic result at variance with the theory as such,
was reached by application of the special statute' 8 on good faith
acquirendi prescription. In the cases under discussion the realistic
result at variance with the theory as such was reached by analogous
application of the irticles of the code dealing with predial servitudes, when the dominant estate is partitioned.'" The owner of the
mineral servitude was likened unto the dominant predial estate and
when he partitioned his estate, that is, his mineral right, by voluntary sale of all his minerals in a certain specified tract, it then
behoved the vendee to use or lose his right on the servient estate,
the land, just as would the owner of any part of a partitioned dominant estate under Article 803. The author of the majority opinion
12. Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37458 (Dec. 15, 1947).
13. Byrd v. Forgotson, La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37457 (Dec. 15, 1947).
14.. Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37458 (Dec. 15, 1947).
15. Byrd v. Forgotson, La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37457 (Dec. 15, 1947).
16. Sample v. Whitaker, 171 La. 949, 132 So. 511 (1930); 172 La. 722,
135 So. 88 (1931); 174 La. 245, 140 So. 36 (1932); Daggett, op. cit. supra note
2, at 79, 80, § 21.
17. Sample v. Whitaker, 174 La. 245, 140 So. 36, 37 (1932).
18. La. Act 64 of 1924, amending Art. 3478, La. Civil Code of 1870.
19. Arts. 656, 776, and 803, La. Civil Code of 1870.
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in Ohio Oil Company v. Ferguson," Justice Hawthorne, "concedes"
that the analogy "is somewhat difficult"! Justice Fournet in his
dissenting opinion terms it "impossible"! It is notable that the four
justices concurring in the result reached the goal by different routes.
This point is made by Justice Fournet, with whom Justice Ponder
concurred in his dissenting opinion.
The outstanding fact upon which the cases are distinguished
by the court from others21 containing expressions maintaining indivisibility of the servitude is that the owner of the original servitude
sold all his minerals in the circumscribed tract. In other cases22
where an area was marked out for the vendee, only a part of the
minerals in the area was sold so the vendor disposed of a part of
the benefits of his right to search, which he retained, though he
limited the area from which these benefits were to issue. Since
the court strenuously maintains in the instant cases that the servitude
was not and could not be divided, that the servitude owner did not
and could not sell a part of his right, then presumably if the vendor
kept a one-millionth part of the benefit in the acreage he would
still have the right to search. He would have little more motive for
doing so than when as in the instant case, he had sold all his
minerals in the acreage. The cases under discussion hold that the
mineral rights in question reverted to the landowner, since there
had been no user or minor co-ownership of a fractional interest.
Who could have used the right? If the right is indivisible and a
part of the right could not be sold, then presumably the vendee
would have had no right to use by search so how could he protect
himself? If he could search, which was indicated, then it would
appear that a mineral servitude owner could dispose of a part of
his right and thus divide it or he had the power to create a new
servitude, a privilege understood to belong only to the landowner.
The court made it clear that there was no co-ownership as would
have been the case had a fractional interest in the benefits been
disposed of. If the right to search had remained with the vendor
servitude owner with accrual of all benefits to the vendee in the
designated area, then it would appear that something in the nature
20. Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37458 (Dec. 15, 1947).
21. Lee v. Giauque, 154 La. 491, 97 So. 669 (1923); Patton v. Frost Lumber
Industries, Inc., 176 La. 916, 147 So. 33 (1933); Connell v. Muslow Oil Co.,
Inc., 186 La. 491, 172 So. 763 (1937); Hodges v. Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So. (2d)
618 (1942).
22. Patton v. Frost Lumber Industries, Inc., 176 La. 916, 147 So. 33 (1933);
Connell v. Muslow Oil Co., Inc., 186 La. 491, 172 So. 763 (1937); Hodges v.
Norton, 200 La. 614, 8 So. (2d) 618 (1942).
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of royalty per se-the Vincent v. Bullock type-would have been
sold by the servitude owner.
As a matter of pure realism, the right seems to have been
divided without damage to the theory of indivisibility, which was
linguistically preserved. This is nothing new as evidenced by the
well known examples cited in the first paragraph of the comment,
dealing with settled rules where division might be said to have
actually occurred.
On the policy question, the dissenting justices seem to have felt
that a settled property rule had been violated, that parties to the
contract had depended on the thought that the right would hold
for the part as long as its life was preserved for the original whole.
Of two innocent parties, certainly the buyer of the part suffered.
The seller did not suffer as he had his remuneration and even if his
faith was good he, by selling, had caused the loss to happen. Another
policy of the state,2" to frown upon tying up property, was preserved
though it does not appear to have been a factor in the decision and
the recent Lenard case24 is diametrically opposed both on this policy
point and the divisibility theory.
The members of the court have recently indicated a marked
individualism, in finding different reasons for like conclusions. This
has ever marked a transitional stage, which often evolves a more
fundamental analysis, stimulating to the healthy progress of the law.
It also encourages other students to evaluate the various theories
advanced. It may be that the conclusion of the two recent cases
under discussion, whether warranted or not, might have been
reached by a more intellectually satisfying course than that pursued
by the author of the majority opinion in the Ohio Oil Company
case.25 The words partition and division are interchangeable. After
the mineral servitude has been likened unto a dominant estate,
obviously it is subject to partition or division, ergo a mineral servitude is divisible. Little has been accomplished by the tortuous
mental journey. Certainly the lands of both estates needed for a
predial servitude are subject to partition or division and rules are
laid down regarding the effect if any of this division upon the use
of the right bearing upon both estates. It is agreed that the mineral
servitude is sui generis, that it does not fit exactly into old legal
23. Daggett, op. cit. sulra note 2, at 15, 16, 17, 18, § 8; 34, § 11; 186, 188,
190, § 60.
24. Lenard v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La. 265, 29 So. (2d) 844 (1947).
25. Ohio Oil Co. v. Ferguson, La. Sup. Ct. Docket No. 37548 (Dec. 15, 1947).
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patterns. However, since only one estate is involved, the "like unto"
a personal servitude category better fits the facts and is more convincing even to a layman than the "like unto" a dominant estate
picture. The rooted ideas of the personal servitude and the indivisibility of a right might have received less jar. The royalty analogy
has been suggested above. The sale of benefit rule might have been
applied to the new set of facts. The contractual limitation of the
use of the original servitude might have been said to have produced
the result. A less extensive use idea mentioned in Article 79026 of
the Code might have been worked out without great harm, under
the facts of this case, to the contiguous estate doctrine. Under the
new set of facts where the servitude owner had disposed of all his
benefits in the plot and apparently had relieved himself of all
responsibilities in connection with the area, a direct statement of
divisibility by this method might have been less disconcerting than
the rationalization of this result with attendant fears of future consequences by the introduction of the dominant estate analogy. The
solution under the lease pattern for distinction between assignment
and sublease and attendant consequences parallels the result achieved
under these new cases on servitude. The criteria in each pattern
seems to be whether the lessor or servitude owner in disposing of
a distinct acreage under his right retained any power over or benefit
from the land marked out in the conveyance.27
A prolonged discussion of these cases and the decisions cited
and distinguished would be repetitious of the materials already carefully outlined by the opinions. The important high points are the
use of the new analogy, the continued preservation of the ideal of
indivisibility, the realistic result under a new set of facts. The life
of the law is said to be in its change and hence new approaches,
whether they are the chosen ones or otherwise, are ever welcome to
students of the law however disturbing they may be to at least part
of the profession dealing wth conveyancing and other every day
duties. Upon the court lay the difficult task of belling this cat.
That bystanders without responsibility proclaim what to them seem
better methods of accomplishing the necessary job is usuallf In
creating the rule of these cases, the court seems to have been less
"artistic" than usual but the rule is new and after the profession has
26. "The time of prescription for non-usage begins for discontinuous servitudes, from the day they ceased to be used; for continuous servitudes, from
the day any act contrary to the servitude has been committed." Art. 790, La.
Civil Code of 1870.
27. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 2, at 124, § 83 et seq.
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become accustomed, it may rank in the same high place given to
other work of the court in its painstaking creation of the law of
mineral rights.
HARRIET S. DAGGETT*

LONG-TERM LEASES AFFECTING MINERALS
There has recently materialized a new type of contract affecting
minerals, which on its face purports to be a sale and long-term lease
of timber, but in actuality entails far-reaching consequences upon
the mineral future of the state. This hybrid contract falls into the
category of neither sale nor lease but partakes of the nature of both,
while embodying many extraneous elements. The fate of .such an
agreement is uncertain since the courts have as yet had no occasion
to pass upon its validity. However, the nature and extent of the
problem and the possible means of coping with it can be appreciated
beforehand.
Any attempt to categorize this new contract should be preceded
by an understanding of its provisions and of the general procedure
followed. A typical situation involves extensive tracts of land
originally purchased primarily for the purpose of timber cuttings.
After the timber has been cut one or more times, the corporate landowner in order to derive revenue from the land grants long-term
leases thereon, conveying at once a sale of the standing timber and
the right to repeated cuttings during a period ranging from sixty to
ninety-nine years. The primary purpose of the lessee might be otherwise than for timber cuttings and may involve cultivation of the soil,
cattlegrazing or trapping. The lessor, however, derives manifold
benefits from the contract-he not only secures a considerable revenue from the transaction, but he is relieved from the responsibility
of paying taxes on the property, retains the title to the land and,
most important of all, exerts the greatest precautions to reserve all
minerals and mineral rights unto himself, including the paramount
rights of ingress, egress, construction and operations. The corporate holder may retain these minerals, either for prospective user,
speculation on the mineral market, or an indefinite holding; or he
may transfer them to subsidiary companies organized solely for the
purpose of securing the mineral development of these lands. In the
latter case, in the event of nonuser during the statutory or prescribed
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.

